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ASTRUE V. RATLIFF AND THE DEATH OF  
STRONG PURPOSIVISM 
FREDERICK LIU†
According to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court is present-
ly embroiled in an interpretive conflict between textualists, on the one 
hand, who believe that “the Constitution, properly understood, re-
quires judges to treat the clear import of an enacted text as conclu-
sive, even when the text fits poorly with its apparent background pur-
poses,”
 
1 and purposivists (or more precisely, “strong purposivists”2), 
on the other, who believe that “the ‘letter’ (text) of a statute must 
yield to its ‘spirit’ (purpose) when the two conflict[].”3  This apparent 
philosophical divide has led one scholar to remark that “textualism 
has never taken hold as the Court’s single, controlling interpretive 
method,”4 and further, that “interpretive consensus” among the Jus-
tices “seem[s] impossible.”5
At first glance, Astrue v. Ratliff,
 
6
 
†
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 a case decided last Term, would 
seem to confirm the intractability of the conflict.  Presented once 
again with a question of statutory interpretation, the Court rested its 
decision in Ratliff on the plain meaning of the statutory text, as re-
flected in dictionaries defining a key term and precedent regarding 
1
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 73 (2006). 
2
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 
n.3 (2001). 
3
Manning, supra note 1, at 71. 
4
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1765 (2010). 
5
Id. at 1757. 
6
130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
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similarly worded provisions in other statutes.7  Writing separately, a 
minority of the Justices insisted that Congress likely never intended 
the result the Court reached,8 and feared that the “practical effect” of 
the Court’s decision would be to “severely undermine[] the [statute’s] 
estimable aim.”9
But Ratliff was not just another battle in an ongoing methodologi-
cal war.  What is striking about the case is that the Justices who wrote 
separately nevertheless joined the Court’s opinion in full; indeed, they 
accepted the Court’s textual analysis as dispositive, despite acknowl-
edging that congressional intent and statutory purpose pointed the 
other way.
 
10
I.  THE JUSTICES’ OPINIONS IN RATLIFF 
  Far from confirming the conventional wisdom, Ratliff de-
monstrates that meaningful, interpretive consensus does exist on the Su-
preme Court.  At long last, textualism’s central tenet—that a clear text 
must be enforced—has prevailed. 
At issue in Ratliff was section 204(d)(1)(A) of the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA), which provides that “a court shall award to a pre-
vailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . in any civil ac-
tion . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court 
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justi-
fied.”11  Ruby Willows Kills Ree had obtained an award of attorney’s 
fees under subsection (d)(1)(A) after prevailing in an action for So-
cial Security benefits against the United States.12  Rather than pay the 
fees award, however, the United States sought to use it to offset a 
preexisting debt Ree owed the federal government.13  Ree’s attorney, 
Catherine Ratliff, challenged the offset, arguing that fees awarded under 
EAJA belong to the litigant’s attorney, not the litigant, and thus could not 
be so used.14
The Supreme Court rejected Ratliff’s challenge.  Justice Thomas’s 
opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court focused on the text of EAJA.  
The Court began by noting that it had “long held,” in the context of 
other fee-shifting statutes, that the term “prevailing party” refers to the 
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Id. at 2525-26. 
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Id. at 2530 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Id. at 2533 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Id. 
11
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
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prevailing litigant.15  It then pointed to other provisions of EAJA that 
“clearly distinguish the party who receives the fees award (the litigant) 
from the attorney who performed the work that generated the fees.”16  
The Court reasoned that these other provisions “underscore that the 
term ‘prevailing party’ in subsection (d)(1)(A) carries its usual and 
settled meaning—prevailing litigant.”17  The Court turned finally to 
subsection (d)(1)(A)’s use of the verb “award.”  Citing the verb’s dic-
tionary definition, the Court concluded that “[t]he plain meaning of 
the word ‘award’ in subsection (d)(1)(A) is . . . that the court shall 
‘give or assign by . . . judicial determination’ to the ‘prevailing party’ 
(here, Ratliff’s client Ree) attorney’s fees in the amount sought and 
substantiated under [the statute].”18  The Court thus held that an 
award of fees under subsection (d)(1)(A) “is payable to the litigant 
and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing 
debt that the litigant owes the United States.”19
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, 
Justice Sotomayor doubted that Congress had even considered the 
question whether the government should be able to use EAJA fee 
awards to offset a litigant’s preexisting debt, and found it likely that if 
Congress had done so, “it would not have wanted [them] to be subject 
to offset.”
 
20  Indeed, she argued, “[s]ubjecting EAJA fee awards to ad-
ministrative offset for a litigant’s debts will unquestionably make it 
more difficult for persons of limited means to find attorneys to 
represent them,”21 thereby “undercut[ting]” EAJA’s “admirable pur-
pose.”22  Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court’s tex-
tual analysis, which she acknowledged “compel[led] the conclusion 
that an attorney’s fee award under [EAJA] is payable to the prevailing 
litigant rather than the attorney.”23
 
15
Id. 
  She thus joined the Court’s opi-
16
Id. at 2525-26. 
17
Id. at 2525. 
18
Id. at 2526 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 125 (5th ed. 1979) and WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 152 (1993)). 
19
Id. at 2524. 
20
Id. at 2530 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2532 (“I ‘find it difficult to 
ascribe to Congress an intent to throw’ an EAJA litigant ‘a lifeline that it knew was a 
foot short. . . . Given the anomalous nature of this result, and its frustration of the very 
purposes behind the EAJA itself, Congress cannot lightly be assumed to have intended 
it.’” (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 890 (1989))). 
21
Id. at 2531. 
22
Id. at 2530; see also id. at 2533 (“[T]he practical effect of our decision severely 
undermines the EAJA’s estimable aim.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 
23
Id. at 2530.  Justice Sotomayor agreed specifically with the Court’s reliance on 
prior cases interpreting the term “prevailing party.”  Id. at 2529-30.  The Court’s dis-
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nion, while urging Congress “to clarify beyond debate” whether the 
“practical effect” of the Court’s decision is “one it actually intends.”24
II.  RATLIFF’S SIGNIFICANCE 
 
That Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor agreed to give ef-
fect to the clear import of EAJA’s text—while acknowledging that 
both congressional intent and statutory purpose pointed in a different 
direction—is significant for three reasons.  First, it suggests agreement 
among the Justices about the goal of statutory interpretation.  Though 
discerning the “intent of the legislature” has traditionally been un-
derstood to be the general goal,25 the particular kind of “intent” 
courts should look for has been the subject of some debate.  Accord-
ing to one line of thought, courts should look for the legislature’s sub-
jective intent—that is, what the legislature actually thought about an 
issue, or if the issue was not considered, what the legislature would 
have thought about it.26  According to another line of thought, asso-
ciated with textualist theory, courts should look instead for what Jus-
tice Scalia calls “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reason-
able person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside 
the remainder of the corpus juris.”27
 
cussion of those precedents formed the starting point of its textual analysis, which pre-
sumed that the term “prevailing party” should be interpreted consistently throughout 
the U.S. Code.  See id. at 2525 (majority opinion). 
  In her concurrence in Ratliff, Jus-
24
Id. at 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 16 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
26
See United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.) 
(“Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, 
into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they 
would have dealt with the concrete occasion.”), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided 
court, 345 U.S. 979 (1953); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom 
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“[T]he task for the judge 
called upon to interpret a statute is . . . one of imaginative reconstruction.  The judge 
should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and 
imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.” (footnote 
omitted)); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907) 
(describing, as legitimate means of interpretation, efforts to “find out directly what the 
law-maker meant by assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and 
endeavoring to gather from the mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he 
sought to meet them, his intention with respect to the particular point in controver-
sy”).  See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222-28 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the 
“specific intent” and “imaginative reconstruction” strains of intentionalist theory). 
27
Scalia, supra note 25, at 17. 
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tice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s holding was contrary to the re-
sult Congress would have intended if it had actually considered the 
issue of offsets.28
Second, the opinions in Ratliff indicate that the Justices agree that 
the various sources of statutory meaning should be considered in a 
hierarchical manner, as opposed to a holistic one.  According to Pro-
fessors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, courts interpret statutes 
by considering each source of statutory meaning (such as text, legisla-
tive history, purpose, and societal values) in light of all the others.
  But her recognition that the Court’s holding was 
nevertheless compelled by EAJA’s text implies that the object of statu-
tory interpretation is, in the end, not the legislature’s subjective in-
tent, but its objectified intent, as textualists have long maintained. 
29  
Eskridge and Frickey compare the process to a “hermeneutical circle,” 
where “[a] part can only be understood in the context of the whole, 
and the whole cannot be understood without analyzing its various 
parts.”30  Neither of the opinions in Ratliff, however, seemed to follow 
such a holistic model.  Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court pro-
ceeded beyond the text of the statute only to address Ratliff’s counte-
rarguments.31  And Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence—though it dis-
cussed other interpretive sources such as subjective legislative intent 
and statutory purpose—viewed them each in isolation, separate from 
the text itself.32  The opinions in Ratliff thus suggest a strict hierarchy 
of sources, whereby each is exhausted one at a time, rather than eva-
luated in relation to all the others.33
Finally, and most importantly, Ratliff signals consensus about what 
lies at the top of the interpretive hierarchy.  For Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the case presented a rare opportunity to 
answer what is perhaps the most fundamental question of statutory in-
terpretation:  When the text of a statute conflicts with its purpose, 
which should prevail?  Textualism has long been defined by the an-
swer that the text should take precedence.
 
34
 
28
Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2530 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
  Purposivism, as reflected 
29
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351-52 (1990). 
30
Id. at 351. 
31
See Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2527-29. 
32
Indeed, nothing in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggests that these other 
sources influenced her view of the text.  See id. at 2529-30, 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
33
Cf. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1758 (noting the rise of strict interpretive hierarchies 
in state methods of statutory interpretation). 
34
See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“[I]f the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given 
effect—at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.”); Scalia, supra note 25, at 22 
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in cases such as Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,35 has long 
been associated with the view that the purpose should prevail.  In Rat-
liff, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor sided definitively with 
textualism.  As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence forthrightly ex-
plained, the purpose of EAJA cut clearly in Ratliff’s favor, but the text 
of the statute compelled the Court to rule against her.36  So much for 
Holy Trinity and the notion that “a thing may be within the letter of 
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, 
nor within the intention of its makers.”37
What about Justice Breyer, arguably the Court’s leading purposiv-
ist, who signed the Court’s opinion but not Justice Sotomayor’s con-
currence?  What accounts for his vote?  One explanation may be that 
he was content to join the Court’s opinion because he thought the sta-
tute’s text accurately expressed its purpose.
  Unwilling to ignore EAJA’s 
text to advance its clear purpose, the concurring Justices joined the 
rest of the Court in placing the statutory text at the top of the inter-
pretive hierarchy. 
38  But that would have re-
quired him to disregard the strong evidence that EAJA’s text and pur-
pose in fact conflicted.39  The more likely explanation is that Justice 
Breyer is a purposivist in only the “weak” sense of the term—an inter-
preter who is willing to rely on purpose “to clarify an ambiguous text,” 
but who is unwilling to use it “to depart from a clear” one.40  His own 
writings suggest as much.  The discussion of statutory interpretation in 
his book Active Liberty focuses on the “interpretive problem [that] aris-
es when statutory language does not clearly answer the question of 
what the statute means or how it applies.”41  In “difficult cases of in-
terpretation in which language is not clear,” Justice Breyer argues, 
“judges should pay primary attention to a statute’s purpose.”42
 
(“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”). 
  The 
implication is that when the statutory language does give a clear an-
35
143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
36
Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2529-30, 2533 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
37
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459. 
38
Cf. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statu-
tory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the as-
sumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legisla-
tive purpose.”). 
39
See Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2530-32 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
40
Manning, supra note 2, at 3 n.3 (emphasis added). 
41
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION 85 (2005) (emphasis added). 
42
Id. 
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swer, consulting such purpose is unnecessary.43
CONCLUSION 
  If this account of Jus-
tice Breyer’s approach is correct, then his vote in Ratliff is easy to ex-
plain.  For him, as for all the other Justices, statutory text ranks at the 
top of the interpretive hierarchy and must be enforced when it is clear. 
Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is not impossible.  It 
is real.  If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead; there is 
agreement now that a clear text must be given effect.  This is not to say 
that interpretive differences no longer remain, for there will still be dis-
putes over whether a text is clear and what to do if it is ambiguous.  But 
at least for now,44
 
 a key battle is over:  In the fight for the top spot in the 
Court’s interpretive hierarchy, the text can declare victory. 
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See also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2007) 
(Breyer, J.) (“A customs statute that imposes a tariff on ‘clothing’ does not impose a 
tariff on automobiles, no matter how strong the policy arguments for treating the two 
kinds of goods alike.”). 
44
It is too early to say conclusively what kind of approach Justice Kagan, who re-
cently replaced Justice Stevens, will bring to statutory interpretation.  Her first opinion 
for the Court, however, suggests an approach consistent with textualist principles.  See 
Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 723-24 (2011) (Kagan, J.) (interpret-
ing the term “applicable” in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006), according to its plain meaning). 
